Do Bills of Rights Matter? An Examination of Court Change, Judicial Ideology, and the Support Structure for Rights in Canada by Songer, Donald R et al.
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Political Science Faculty Publications Political Science
Winter 2013
Do Bills of Rights Matter? An Examination of
Court Change, Judicial Ideology, and the Support
Structure for Rights in Canada
Donald R. Songer
dsonger@sc.edu
Susan W. Johnson
swjohnso@uncg.edu
Jennifer Barnes Bowie
University of Richmond, jbowie@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/polisci-faculty-publications
Part of the Models and Methods Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Political Science Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Songer, Donald R., Susan W. Johnson, Jennifer Barnes Bowie. "Do Bills of Rights Matter? An Examination of Court Change, Judicial
Ideology, and the Support Structure for Rights in Canada." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 51, no. 1 (Winter 2013): 297-328.
297
Do Bills of Rights Matter? An 
Examination of Court Change, Judicial 
Ideology, and the Support Structure for 
Rights in Canada
DONALD R. SONGER, SUSAN W. JOHNSON & 
JENNIFER BARNES BOWIE *
Competing theories regarding the development of a “rights revolution” in Canada have appeared 
in the judicial and constitutional literature in recent years. On the one hand, scholars argue 
that the profound effects often attributed to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms are substantially 
overstated, and conventional analyses have overlooked the more important role of changes in 
what is called the “support structure” for rights. Others have advanced a competing theory 
that the Charter created an expansion of civil liberties. We take advantage of an extensive 
dataset on the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada to provide a more systematic test 
of these competing theories. We conclude that the adoption of the Charter had effects on 
both the rights agenda and the constitutional issues agenda of the Court, which were both 
substantively large and statistically signifi cant. There was some indication that changes in 
agenda control mattered, but the effects were not consistent across our time-series models. 
The more limited claim that increases in the support structure are one of multiple factors 
that are associated with agenda change received only mixed support. In short, we found that 
bills of rights do matter.
Des théories concurrentes sur l’avènement d’une « révolution des droits » au Canada 
se sont manifestées au cours des dernières années dans la documentation judiciaire et 
constitutionnelle. D’une part, des chercheurs soutiennent que les effets profonds souvent 
attribués à la Charte des droits et libertés sont sensiblement surestimés et que les analyses 
traditionnelles ont sous-évalué le rôle plus important de l’évolution survenue dans ce qu’on 
appelle la « structure de soutien » des droits. D’autres avancent une théorie concurrente 
voulant que la Charte ait conduit à  une amplifi cation des libertés civiles. Nous tirons parti 
d’une vaste banque de données relatives aux jugements de la Cour suprême du Canada afi n 
* Respectively, Professor of Political Science at the University of South Carolina; Associate 
Professor of Political Science at the University of North Carolina Greensboro; Assistant 
Professor of Political Science at the University of Richmond.
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de mettre plus systématiquement à l’épreuve ces théories concurrentes. Nous arrivons à la 
conclusion que l’adoption de la Charte a entraîné un effet à la fois important et statistiquement 
signifi catif sur les priorités de la Cour tant dans le domaine des droits que dans celui des 
questions constitutionnelles. Il semblerait qu’une évolution soit survenue dans les priorités, 
mais que les effets n’aient pas été uniformes dans tous nos modèles de série chronologique. 
L’idée plus restreinte que l’évolution de la structure de soutien fi gure au nombre des multiples 
facteurs associés à l’évolution des priorités n’a reçu qu’un soutien mitigé. Bref, nous avons 
découvert que les déclarations des droits possèdent une importance bien réelle.
SCHOLARS HAVE BEEN INTERESTED in what infl uences higher court agendas in 
the United States1 and other countries.2 In this vein, they have examined the extent 
1. HW Perry, Jr, Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in in the United States Supreme Court 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991); Donald R Songer, Reginald S Sheehan & 
Susan B Haire, Continuity and Change on the United States Courts of Appeals (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2000).
2. Roy B Flemming, “Processing Appeals for Judicial Review: Th e Institutions of Agenda 
Setting in the Supreme Courts of Canada and the United States” in Martin Westmacott and 
Hugh Mellon, eds, Political Dispute and Judicial Review: Assessing the Work of the Supreme 
Court of Canada (Scarborough: Th ompson Learning, 2000) 40 [Flemming, “Processing 
Appeals”]; Roy B Flemming, Tournament of Appeals: Granting Judicial Review in Canada 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2004) [Flemming, Tournament of Appeals]; 
Peter McCormick, Supreme at Last: Th e Evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: 
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to which constitutional bills of rights matter in terms of infl uencing high court 
dockets.3 Understandably, because of the relatively recent passage of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms4 in Canada, scholars have been particularly curious 
about the impact of the Charter on the Supreme Court of Canada’s (the Court) 
docket. Within the literature on Canadian courts, there is a debate regarding 
whether passage of the Charter substantially impacted the Court’s agenda. On 
one side of the debate, it is argued that the profound eff ects often attributed to 
the Charter are substantially overstated and that the structures supporting rights 
are what greatly infl uenced the Court’s agenda. Th is view, held by scholars such 
as Charles L. Epp, suggests that bills of rights matter, “but only to the extent that 
individuals can mobilize the resources necessary to invoke them through strategic 
litigation.”5
On the other side of the debate, some suggest that the Charter was the cause 
of the expansion of civil liberties and rights throughout Canada.6 While some have 
suggested that this increased emphasis on the protection of rights is attributed 
to legislative activism,7 we, like other scholars,8 take a court-centered approach 
James Lorimer, 2000) [McCormick, Supreme at Last]; Rachel Sieder, Line Schjolden & Alan 
Angell, eds, Th e Judicialization of Politics in Latin America (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2005); C Neal Tate, “Courts and Crisis Regimes: A Th eory Sketch with Asian Case Studies” 
(1993) 46:2 Pol Res Q 311.
3. Charles R Epp, “Do Bills of Rights Matter? Th e Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” 
(1996) 90:4 Am Poli Sci Rev 765 [Epp, “Do Bills of Rights Matter?”]; Linda Camp Keith, 
“Constitutional Provisions for Individual Human Rights (1977-1996): Are Th ey More than 
Mere ‘Window Dressing?’” (2002) 55:1 Poli Res Q 111; Rainer Knopff  & FL Morton, 
Charter Politics (Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1992) [Knopff  & Morton, Charter Politics].
4. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 
11 [Charter]. Th e Charter was adopted in 1982, but the fi rst case raising a Charter claim did 
not reach the Court until 1984.
5. Epp, “Do Bills of Rights Matter?,” supra note 3 at 765. See also Charles R Epp, Th e Rights 
Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and Supreme Courts in Comparative Perspective (Chicago: Th e 
University of Chicago Press, 1998) [Epp, Rights Revolution].
6. Sebastien Lebel-Grenier, “Th e Charter and Legitimization of Judicial Activism” in Paul Howe 
& Peter H Russell, eds, Judicial Power and Canadian Democracy (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2001) 94; Christopher P Manfredi, Judicial Power and the Charter: Canada 
and the Paradox of Liberal Constitutionalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) 
[Manfredi, Judicial Power];  Donald R Songer, Th e Transformation of the Supreme Court of 
Canada: An Empirical Examination (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008). 
7. James B Kelly, Governing with the Charter: Legislative and Judicial Activism and Framers’ Intent 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005).
8. Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Scarborough: Th omson Canada, 2001); Bernard 
W Funston & Eugene Meehan, Canada’s Constitutional Law in a Nutshell, 2d ed (Scarborough: 
Th omson Canada, 1998); Raul A Sanchez Urribarri et al, “Explaining Changes to Rights 
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in addressing whether bills of rights matter. Using more recently collected data 
than some previous studies, we provide a more comprehensive analysis of these 
alternative perspectives. Specifi cally, we take advantage of an extensive dataset 
on the decisions of the Court to provide a more systematic test of the support 
structure thesis and competing theories of agenda change. Using this new data, we 
create numerical measures of the main components of the support structure thesis. 
Next, we test the eff ects of these measures on the Court’s changing agenda using 
a time-series analysis of changes in the agenda of the Court over a fi fty-seven year 
period running from 1949 to 2005. Th e time-series analysis includes measures 
of judicial ideology, changes in the Court’s docket, and power of judicial review 
under the Charter, along with measures of the support structure. We fi nd there is 
mixed evidence that increases in the support structure are positively related to an 
increased presence of rights issues on the docket. More importantly, we fi nd that 
the adoption of the Charter had a profound eff ect on changes in the rights agenda 
of the Court, an eff ect that remains strong even after controls for changes in the 
support structure, judicial ideology, and docket control are included in the model.
I. EFFECTS OF CONSTITUTIONS AND BILLS OF RIGHTS
Bills of rights are not self-executing; such constitutional provisions will only 
be eff ective if there are litigants and lawyers to bring cases, judges prepared to 
implement the constitutional procedures, and governments willing to abide by the 
rulings of the courts. Scholars disagree about the extent to which judges, external 
actors, or institutional structures matter in the attainment of rights. Cultural 
explanations for rights revolutions suggest that support structures must exist 
in order for rights to be obtained, and that such support structures may largely 
account for the achievement of rights in various societies.9 Other scholars stress 
what they perceive to be the relatively greater importance of constitutional bills 
of rights for the attainment of rights. Resurgences in studying the importance of 
constitutions have occurred in recent years,10 with rational choice theory becoming 
Litigation: Testing a Multivariate Model in a Comparative Framework” (2011) 73:2 J Pol 391. 
9. Epp, “Do Bills of Rights Matter,” supra note 3; Epp, Rights Revolution, supra note 5.
10. Geoff rey Brennan & Alan Hamlin, “A Revisionist View of the Separation of Powers” (1994) 
6:3 J Th eoretical Pol 345; Douglas Greenberg et al, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy: 
Transitions in the Contemporary World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Stephen 
Holmes, Passions and Constraints: On the Th eory of Liberal Democracy (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1995); Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry 
into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes (New York: New York University Press, 1994).
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more accepted in the fi elds of comparative politics and judicial studies.11 Th is 
resurgence in the study of the impact in constitutions is fueled in large part by the 
observation that virtually all of the newer democracies in Eastern and Southern 
Europe and in Latin America have adopted bills of basic rights as parts of their 
new constitutions.12 Tom Ginsburg argues that these new constitutions, with their 
associated mechanisms for judicial review of government action, facilitate democracy 
because they provide a form of “insurance” to prospective electoral losers.13 But until 
very recently, there were virtually no empirical studies of the eff ects of these new bills 
of rights.14 Th at changed recently with the fi rst attempt to quantitatively assess the 
impact of written constitutional rights provisions on the reduction of state terror. 
Undertaking a broad cross-national analysis of countries with populations of at least 
one hundred-thousand, Linda Camp Keith, C. Neal Tate, and Steven C. Poe found 
that the adoption of nine specifi c constitutional protections of civil liberties were 
signifi cantly associated with lower levels of the abuse of civil liberties.15
Th e comparative literature on courts also emphasizes the importance of bills 
of rights to judicial decision making and agenda change. On this point, David 
G. Barnum found that India’s judicial activism and constitutional due process are 
linked.16 Mary L. Volcansek found that the Constitutional Court in Italy managed 
to strengthen its power of judicial review in strategic ways and increase a civil 
liberties agenda, despite external attempts by the state to thwart its eff orts.17 Th is 
line of research on the institutional impact of bills of rights in the courts of diff erent 
11. Mark Irving Lichbach & Alan S Zuckerman, eds, Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture 
and Structure (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Margaret Levi, “A 
Model, a Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis” in 
Mark Irving Lichbach & Alan S Zuckerman, eds, Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture 
and Structure (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 19; Mancur Olson Jr, 
Th e Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965); Gary W Cox 
& Mathew D McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1993); Douglass C North, Institutions, Institutional Change 
and Economic Performance (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
12. Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: Th e Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004); Seider, Schjolden & Angell, supra note 2.
13. Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in East Asia (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 18.
14. Hirschl, supra note 12.
15. “Is the Law a Mere Parchment Barrier to Human Rights Abuse?” (2009) 71:2 J Pol 644.
16. “Article 21 and Policy Making Role of Courts in India: An American Perspective” (1988) 30 
JILI 19.
17. “Judicial Activism in Italy” in Kenneth M Holland, ed, Judicial Activism in Comparative 
Perspective (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1991) 117.
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countries builds on previous research surrounding what C. Neal Tate and Torbjorn 
Vallinder refer to as the judicialization of politics.18
An extensive recent scholarship has assessed the impact of the Charter 
on judicial decision making without producing agreement as to whether the 
eff ect has been positive or negative. Michael Mandel argues that the Charter 
has led to the “legalization” of politics, and that this change has benefi ted 
wealthy interests.19 Allan C. Hutchinson takes a similar approach, suggesting 
that judicial implementation of the Charter does not lead to social progress.20 
In contrast, Rainer Knopff  and F.L. Morton emphasize top-down approaches, 
whereby bills of rights and judicial activism encourage interest group litigation 
and support structures to emerge.21 Knopff  and Morton suggest that the Court 
uses the Charter to advance its activist agenda, which has helped to transfer 
power to left wing social activists.22 Th ey contend that the Charter does not 
cause the extension of rights to minority groups in Canada; rather, judicial 
activism and a conscious decision on the part of activist judges to use the 
Charter in this way have led to decisions that benefi t certain special interests. 
While Christopher P. Manfredi takes a less explicitly ideological approach, 
he too notes that the adoption of the Charter has had a profound eff ect on 
the development of judicial power and the agenda of the Court, leading to 
increasing concerns about the tension between judicial review and liberal 
constitutionalism.23 Th ese critiques of the Charter’s policy impact led to a 
recent assessment that “[v]irtually all scholars who have joined the debate over 
this new policy-making role of the Court seem to have assumed … that the 
Charter of Rights was the critical event that enabled the Court … to adopt a 
more overtly political role.”24 
18. Th e Global Expansion of Judicial Power (New York: New York University Press, 1995). 
19. Th e Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada (Toronto: Th ompson 
Education, 1989).
20. Waiting for a Coraf: A Critique of Law and Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1995). 
21. Charter Politics, supra note 3; FL Morton, “Th e Political Impact of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms” (1987) 20:1 Can J Poli Sci 31 at 39.
22. Th e Charter Revolution and the Court Party (Toronto: Broadview Press, 2000).
23. Manfredi, Judicial Power, supra note 6; see also Christopher P  Manfredi,  Judicial Power and 
the Charter: Canada and the Paradox of Liberal Constitutionalism, 2d ed  (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001).
24. Songer, supra note 6, at 71.
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II. SUPPORT STRUCTURES AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE 
INFLUENCE OF CONSTITUTIONS
Some scholars have suggested that there are reasons to be skeptical that a bill of 
rights by itself will have much eff ect on either an increasing presence of rights 
issues on the agendas of top courts or on judicial support for rights claimants. For 
instance in Canada, Epp argues that the passage of the Charter in 1982 had only a 
modest eff ect on the emergence of either a rights agenda or on increased judicial 
review by the Court.25 Instead, he suggests that it was increases in the support 
structure for legal mobilization, assisted by increasing judicial docket control, 
that had the greatest impact on the development of a rights agenda on the Court. 
Epp develops a theoretically rich account of why strong support structures for 
rights are essential for developing a strong rights agenda on appellate courts and 
for increasing judicial support for rights. He further suggests that the extent of 
judicial control over its own docket is important for the development of a rights 
agenda. In particular, he notes that the infl uence of judicial attitudes that favour 
rights expansion is “conditioned by the extent of discretionary control that judges 
have over their docket.”26 Furthermore, Epp maintains that only when there is an 
adequate support structure for rights will courts participate in a “rights revolution.”27 
As Epp envisions it, this support structure will consist primarily of organized 
group support for rights, fi nancing (particularly government fi nancing) for rights 
litigation, and a legal profession that is racially and ethnically diverse and open to 
women. Raul A. Sanchez Urribarri et al build upon the support structure theory 
in suggesting that while at least some minimal or threshold level is necessary in 
the “support structure for rights,” it is less clear that incremental increases above 
those threshold levels of the support structure will increase the number of rights 
cases on the agenda of a top court.28 
As evidence for the support structure theory, Epp examines the growth of the 
support structure and changes in the rights agenda and rights support before and 
after the adoption of the Charter. 29 He explains that in order to demonstrate the 
importance of support structures, one needs to test their infl uence compared to 
several important alternative explanations, including the eff ects of a constitutional 
25. Epp, Rights Revolution, supra note 5.
26. Epp, “Do Bills of Rights Matter?,” supra note 3 at 768.
27. Epp, Rights Revolution, supra note 5 at 5.
28. Supra note 8.
29. Epp, “Do Bills of Rights Matter?,” supra note 3. Th e Charter was offi  cially adopted in 1982, 
but the fi rst case raising a Charter claim did not reach the Court until 1984.
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bill of rights, the justices’ policy preferences, and the extent of judicial discretion 
over the docket. Epp suggests that incremental increases above threshold levels of 
the support structure lead directly to corresponding increases in the rights agenda.30 
Graphing the increase in civil liberties cases over time in fi ve-year increments, he 
fi nds that since the 1960s, there has been a steady increase in the support structure 
for rights in Canada. Epp concludes that the increase in the support structure 
through increased interest-group litigation, not the change to the Court’s docket 
in 1975 or the adoption of the Charter in 1982, caused an increase in civil liberties 
cases decided by the Court.31 Epp admits, however, that the slender evidence he 
marshals in support of his thesis represents only a “preliminary analysis.”32 Now 
that a much larger body of data on the decisions of the Court is available, it is time 
for a more systematic analysis of the important question he raises.
III. OTHER INFLUENCES ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOUR
Beyond the debate over the impact of the constitutional protection of rights, there 
is broad agreement over the importance of two other characteristics of appellate 
courts for their policy making roles: the existence of substantial control by the 
justices over their docket and the ideology or political preferences of the justices. 
In the United States, empirical scholars have long argued that docket control is 
an essential precondition for active policy making by the justices.33 Th e support 
structure thesis suggests that the importance of docket control for policy making in 
the United States extends more broadly to other common law courts. For instance, 
Epp notes that “the infl uence of judicial attitudes is likely to depend on … the 
extent to which judges can choose which cases to decide.”34 Peter McCormick makes 
a similar argument for the transformation of the role of the Court in Canadian 
politics, citing the 1975 amendments to the Supreme Court Act,35 which increased 
30. Epp, Rights Revolution, supra note 5.
31. Ibid at 775.
32. Epp’s analysis relies on data on the agenda of the Court for seven year-long periods. Each 
of these data points are fi ve years apart and refl ect the assumption that there was a steady 
increase from the agenda of the court in one year to the next sampled point, fi ve years later.
33. Jeff rey A Segal & Harold J Spaeth, Th e Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993) [Segal & Spaeth, Attitudinal Model]; Jeff rey A Segal 
& Harold J Spaeth, Th e Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) [Segal & Spaeth, Attitudinal Model Revisited]; David W 
Rohde & Harold J Spaeth, Supreme Court Decision Making (San Francisco: WH Freeman, 
1976).  
34. Epp, Rights Revolution, supra note 5 at 14.
35. RSC, 1985, c S-26.
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the Court’s discretionary control of its docket, as constituting a “silent revolution” 
that was of “enormous importance”36 in the evolution of the Court from a “bit 
player to a leading actor”37 in Canadian politics. As Ian Bushnell notes, “Chief 
Justice Laskin used the occasion of this expansion of the Court’s control of its 
docket to announce that “the Court’s status as Canada’s ultimate appellate Court” 
was fi nally sealed.”38 Recent assessments of the changing role of the Court are in 
agreement that the adoption of the Supreme Court Act of 1975, which expanded 
the Court’s discretionary control of its docket, was one of the key changes that 
helped to bring about the transformation of the Court.39
Once appellate courts have achieved docket control and possess a substantial 
degree of judicial independence, a major determinant of judicial decisions is 
thought to be the political values of the justices. While this view of the primacy 
of judicial attitudes has long been the conventional understanding of decision 
making on the US Supreme Court (USSC),40 substantial evidence exists of the 
infl uence of the political values of the justices in a number of other countries.41 
In Australia, for instance, Brian Galligan found that judicial activism played 
a role in judicial decisions, despite the absence of an explicit bill of rights.42 
Similarly, Stacia L. Haynie,43 David Robertson,44 and George H. Gadbois Jr.45 
36. Canada’s Courts (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 1994) at 77.
37. McCormick, Supreme at Last, supra note 2 at 2.
38. Th e Captive Court: A Study of the Supreme Court of Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1992) at 405. 
39. Songer, supra note 6; Lori Hausegger,  Matthew Hennigar & Troy Riddell, Canadian Courts: 
Law, Politics and Process (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2009); Flemming, “Processing 
Appeals,” supra note 2.
40. See Glendon Shubert, Th e Judicial Mind: Th e Attitudes and Ideologies of Supreme Court 
Justices, 1946-1963 (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965); Segal & Spaeth, 
Attitudinal Model, supra note 33; Segal & Spaeth, Attitudinal Model Revisited, supra note 33; 
Segal & Rhode, supra note 33; Forrest Maltzman, James F Spriggs II & Paul J Wahlbeck, 
Crafting Law on the Supreme Court: Th e Collegial Game (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000).
41. Stacia L Haynie, Judging in Black and White: Decision Making in the South African Appellate 
Division, 1950-1990 (New York: Peter Lang, 2003); Glendon Schubert & David J Danelski, 
eds, Comparative Judicial Behavior: Cross-Cultural Studies of Political Decision-Making in the 
East and West (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969); Brian Galligan, “Judicial Activism 
in Australia” in Kenneth M Holland, ed,  Judicial Activism in Comparative Perspective (New 
York: St Martin’s Press, 1991) 70.
42. Galligan, supra note 41.
43. Haynie, supra note 41.
44. Judicial Discretion in the House of Lords (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
45. “Selection, Background Characteristics, and Voting Behavior of Indian Supreme Court 
Judges” in Schubert & Danelski, supra note 41.
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report fi nding evidence of the infl uence of the political values of the justices on 
the decisions of the top appellate courts in South Africa, the United Kingdom, 
and India, respectively. Turning to Canada, recent works46 have reinforced a 
number of earlier studies that noticed the infl uence of Supreme Court justices’ 
political values on their decisions.47 
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE ASSUMED PRIMACY OF THE 
SUPPORT STRUCTURE  
According to those who argue for the primacy of the support structure for the 
development of a rights agenda, there are three types of resources—organized 
group support, fi nancing, and the structure of the legal profession—that appear 
to be important conditions for shaping access to the judiciary.
A long line of research demonstrates that in the United States, groups 
participating as amici have a major impact on agenda decisions by the USSC. 
Th e agenda-setting process in Canada, however, is not the same as in the United 
States. In contrast to the United States, interest groups as interveners (functionally 
the same as amici in the United States) play a less direct role in the leave to appeal 
process in Canada. Interviews with the justices on the Court indicate that all of 
the justices agree that interest groups are not permitted to participate in the leave 
to appeal process.48 Th is is confi rmed by Roy B. Flemming, who reports that 
interest group interveners’ “involvement focuses exclusively on the stage after leave 
applications are granted… . Interest group interveners are conspicuously absent 
in the Canadian agenda-setting process.”49 Indirectly, however, interest groups 
might have an eff ect on the agenda of the Court, given their participation in the 
decisions of lower courts from which the appeals are drawn. Interest groups in 
46. CL Ostberg & Matthew Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making in the Supreme Court of 
Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2007); Songer, supra note 6.
47. Donald E Fouts, “Policy Making in the Supreme Court of Canada, 1950-1960” in Schubert 
& Danelski, supra note 41; Sidney Peck, “A Scalogram Analysis of the Supreme Court 
of Canada, 1958-1967” in Schubert & Danelski (ibid); C Neal Tate & Panu Sittiwong, 
“Decision Making in the Canadian Supreme Court: Extending the Personal Attributes 
Model Across Nations” (1989) 51:4 J Poli 900; CL Ostberg & Matthew Wetstein, 
“Dimensions of Attitudes Underlying Search and Seizure Decisions of the Supreme Court 
of Canada” (1998) 31:4 Can J Poli Sci 767; Andrew D Heard, “Th e Charter in the Supreme 
Court of Canada: Th e Importance of Which Judges Hear an Appeal” (1991) 24:2 Can J Poli 
Sci 289.
48. For details of the interview process, see Songer, supra note 6 at 12, 255-59 
49. Flemming, Tournament of Appeals, supra note 2 at 13 [emphasis in original].
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Canada have also been active in legal education and judicial training,50 which may 
also indirectly infl uence the Court’s agenda setting. 
As direct parties bringing cases to the Court, interest groups also play a much 
smaller role in Canada than in the United States. In support of this point, Flemming 
notes that interest group participation is at much lower levels in Canada than in the 
United States, and in his extensive study of the leave to appeal process,51 he considers 
their role to be of so little signifi cance that he does not even discuss them in his 
catalog of the major players in the leave process. Similarly, Ian Brodie notes that 
in Canada, interest groups participate mainly as interveners, rather than as direct 
parties in their campaigns to infl uence the Court.52 Th is anecdotal assessment is 
supported by Donald R. Songer’s fi nding that all groups and associations combined, 
other than business and labour unions (a category that includes some groups that 
have nothing to do with the promotion of rights causes), constituted only 1.7 per 
cent of the appellants bringing their cases to the Court between 1970 and 2003.53 
Th ese fi ndings are further confi rmed by interviews conducted by the authors with 
two of the most prominent and infl uential rights groups in Canada: the Canadian 
Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) and the Women’s Legal Education and Action 
Fund (LEAF). Both groups told the authors that they relied only on their role as 
interveners to infl uence the rights decisions of the Court. Neither group sponsored 
cases and neither participated directly in the leave to appeal process before the 
Court.54 Lori Hausegger, Matthew Hennigar, and Troy Riddell note that interest 
groups in Canada have a large disincentive against direct sponsorship of cases.55 
For example, in Lavigne v Ontario Public Service Employees Union,56 not only did 
the National Citizens Coalition, which sponsored the case, lose, but the Court 
also ordered that it pay the court costs of the union and groups who intervened 
on the Coalition’s behalf.
Together, these fi ndings on the very minor role of interest groups as either direct 
parties or interveners in the leave to appeal process cast doubt on the theoretical 
underpinnings of the argument that an extensive support structure is critical to the 
50. Hausegger, Hennigar & Riddell, supra note 39 [emphasis on original].
51. Flemming, Tournament of Appeals, supra note 2.
52. Friends of the Court: Th e Privileging of Interest Group Litigants in Canada (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2002).
53. Songer, supra note 6 at 81.
54. Interview of Kerri Froc, senior offi  cial of the women’s Legal Education and Action Fund, by 
Donald Songer (12 June 2001).
55. Hausegger, Hennigar, & Riddell, supra, note 39.
56. [1991] 2 SCR 211, 3 OR (3d) 511.
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rights agenda of the Court. If interest groups play such an indirect role in the leave to 
appeal process, then the increase in the number of interest groups in Canadian society 
would appear to have minimal infl uence on the increasing rights agenda of the Court.
Another possible explanation for the substantial increase to the rights agenda of the 
Court centres on the changing structure of the legal profession. Of particular note is 
the growth of a number of large law fi rms in Canada and the increasing diversifi cation 
(especially gender diversifi cation) in supporting the increasing rights agenda of the 
Court. Recently, however, Flemming assessed the factors that infl uence the success of 
leave applications and found that attorneys from large fi rms are no more successful 
than other attorneys in the leave to appeal process.57 
V. A MODEL OF SUPREME COURT AGENDA CHANGE
As noted above, prior scholarship suggests that that the rights agendas of courts may 
be infl uenced by the presence or absence of an explicit constitutional guarantee of 
rights, the nature of the support structure for rights litigation, the degree of docket 
control possessed by the top court, and the political preferences of the justices 
on the court. We construct a model of agenda change on the Court to determine 
the relative impact of each of these four factors on increases in the rights agenda. 
Specifi cally, we hypothesize that (1) the adoption of the Charter will increase the 
proportion of rights cases and the proportion of constitutional cases58 on the agenda 
57. See Flemming, Tournament of Appeals, supra note 2. Moreover, while it is plausible to 
believe that the increasing gender diversity of the legal profession may make it easier to fi nd 
attorneys who will bring gender-equality cases (and perhaps other discrimination cases) to 
the Court, the support structure argument for the importance of gender diversity provides 
no basis for believing that an increased number of female attorneys is important for bringing 
criminal appeals to the Court. Th is is important, because when Epp’s category of rights cases 
is broken down into its specifi c issue components, it appears that at least from 1970 on, 
more than 80 per cent of all of the rights cases are criminal appeals. 
58. We use the term “rights cases” sensu Epp—i.e., all cases involving personal rights, freedoms, 
and liberties whether brought under the Charter, statutory protection of rights, or common 
law protection of rights. “Constitutional cases” refer to all cases in which there is a signifi cant 
issue addressed in the majority opinion of the Court involving the interpretation or 
application of any provision of the Canadian Constitution. Th ese can involve claims under 
the Charter or the Constitution Act, 1867. As indicated below, “rights cases” map only into 
the fi rst dependent variable (referred to above as the “rights agenda”). Our conception of 
constitutional cases is broader than Epp’s conception. Th us, we note that we test three 
hypotheses related to constitutional cases on the agenda of the Court. Below, we indicate 
that our second dependent variable is the proportion of cases in which the Court declared a 
statute unconstitutional (under either the Charter or the Constitution Act, 1867). Th is is the 
same as a variable used in Epp’s analysis. In the next paragraph, below, we indicate that our 
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of the Court; (2) increases in the strength of the support structure for rights will 
increase the proportion of rights cases and the proportion of constitutional cases 
on the agenda of the Court; (3) increases in the degree of control of its docket will 
increase the proportion of rights cases and the proportion of constitutional cases on 
the agenda of the Court; and (4) as the ideology of the Court’s majority becomes 
more liberal, the proportion of rights cases and the proportion of constitutional 
cases on the agenda of the Court will increase.
To test these hypotheses, we constructed a database based on the universe of 
published decisions of the Court for a fi fty-seven year period (1949-2005). Th e 
unit of analysis is the aggregate composition of the Court’s docket for each year. 
To compute the aggregate scores for each year, we supplemented data from the 
High Courts Judicial Database (HCJD).59 
To assess fully the impact of the Charter on the Court’s agenda, we need to 
examine both the proportion of cases that deal explicitly with rights issues as well 
as those that tap the role of the Court more generally in constitutional politics. 
To accomplish this goal, we created four dependent variables. For each calendar 
year, we computed the percentage of cases appearing on the docket of the Court 
in four categories: cases raising rights claims, cases in which the Court struck 
down a statute as unconstitutional, cases in which the Court either struck down 
a statute or overturned the actions of some executive offi  cial, and cases in which a 
substantial question of constitutional interpretation was discussed in the opinion 
of the Court. Th ese four measures of the annual agenda of the Court become our 
dependent variables in the analysis below. 
For the fi rst dependent variable (the rights agenda), we follow Epp’s conception 
of rights cases. Th at is, we combined all cases raising criminal rights issues with those 
third dependent variable is the proportion of cases in which either a statute or the action of 
some government executive offi  cial was declared unconstitutional (under either the Charter 
or the Constitution Act, 1867). In the same paragraph we indicate that the fourth dependent 
variable is the proportion of cases in which there was a signifi cant constitutional issue (under 
either the Charter or the Constitution Act, 1867) that was considered by the justices.
59. Th e data and codebooks for the HCJD can be downloaded from the JURI project 
at the University of South Carolina. Th e Judicial Research Initiative, online: <http://
artsandsciences.sc.edu/poli/juri/>. Th e Canadian data in the HCJD include the universe of 
decisions published in the Supreme Court Reports for the years 1970–2003. Th e authors 
coded all of the decisions from 2004 and 2005 and from 1949 to 1969, following the 
same coding scheme. Th e HCJD data are part of a larger project funded by the National 
Science Foundation, “Collaborative Research: Fitting More Pieces into the Puzzle of 
Judicial Behavior: a Multi-Country Database and Program of Research,” SES-9975323; 
“Collaborative Research: Extending a Multi-Country Database and Program of Research,” 
SES-0137349, C Neal Tate et al, Principal Investigators. 
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addressing traditional personal rights, such as claims relating to equality, privacy, 
freedom of expression or political participation, freedom of religion, procedural 
fairness, and the rights of language groups and indigenous peoples. 
For our second dependent variable, we also follow Epp’s lead, computing 
the proportion of cases in each term in which the Court declared a statute 
unconstitutional.60 Th is represents what might be termed a “narrow” version of 
the court’s judicial review function.
For the remaining two dependent variables, we employ a broader understanding 
of the role of the Court in constitutional politics. Th us, our third dependent variable 
is the proportion of cases each term in which the Court exercised judicial review 
to strike down either a statute (including provincial laws and local ordinances) 
or the actions of some executive offi  cial. It thus represents a broader version of 
judicial review. Th e fi nal dependent variable is the proportion of cases each term 
in which there was a signifi cant constitutional issue raised. Since one might 
argue that a constitutional decision to uphold a statute or administrative action 
is as much a part of constitutional law making as a decision to strike one down, 
this last category provides the broadest measure of how active the Court was in 
constitutional policy making.
To directly assess whether “constitutions matter,” we run separate time-series 
models of agenda change for each of our four dependent variables. We create 
independent variables to assess each of the four hypothesized infl uences on agenda 
change. For the hypothesized eff ects on agenda change (hypotheses one and three), 
we include intervention variables that mark the dates of institutional change. 
Specifi cally, to assess the impact of the Charter (H1), all years from 1984 onward 
are coded “1” and all years before 1984 are coded “0.” Signifi cant expansions of 
the degree of docket control possessed by the Court occurred with the enactment 
of the Supreme Court Act in 1975, and its subsequent amendment in 1997.61 
Th us, all years from 1975 to the present are coded “1” for the variable “Docket 
Change 1975,” and all years from 1997 onward are coded “1” for the variable 
“Docket Change 1997.” For both variables, the years before the institutional 
change are coded “0.” 
60. Epp, “Do Bills of Rights Matter?,” supra note 3.
61. In 1975, Parliament granted the Court nearly complete control of its discretionary docket in 
civil cases, substantially reducing the number of “appeals as of right” the Court was required 
to hear. Ian Bushnell, “Leave to Appeal Applications in the Supreme Court of Canada: A 
Matter of Public Importance” (1982) 3 Sup Ct L Rev 479. In 1997, the remainder of the 
Court’s mandatory jurisdiction in criminal cases was also largely converted to discretionary. 
Songer, supra note 6.
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To tap the eff ects of changes in the support structure for rights (H2), we 
utilize the two measures used by Epp:62 legal aid expenditures by the province of 
Ontario and the changing size of Canada’s lawyer population.63 For both sets of 
data, we expanded the data so that we would have annual values for each variable 
for the whole fi fty-seven year period we analyzed.
To measure the ideology of the Court, we computed the proportion of decisions 
in rights cases each year that supported the rights claimant (i.e., that supported 
a liberal position). We lagged this measure one year.64 We also included in our 
models a multiplicative term to assess the interaction of our measure of ideology 
with a dummy variable for the agenda change that occurred in 1975.
62. See Epp, “Do Bills of Rights Matter?,” supra note 3. Epp also conceptualized the number 
of interest groups supporting rights as a part of the support structure, but because interest 
groups do not play a signifi cant role in agenda setting in Canada, as we noted above, we did 
not include any measures of the number of interest groups in our model.
63. See ibid. While it might be preferable to utilize a measure of the combined legal aid 
expenditures from all provinces in Canada, we followed Epp’s lead in using the Ontario data 
as a rough indicator of the impact of external funding of rights cases for several reasons. 
First, it appears that comparable data from all provinces are not readily available for the 
entire period included in our analysis. In addition, even if such data were available, there is 
no obvious best way to weight the data from the diff erent provinces. For example, aid from 
Ontario certainly has a greater potential to infl uence the overall agenda of the Court than aid 
from New Brunswick because both the population and the amount of litigation in Ontario 
is substantially larger than that in New Brunswick. But empirically, the relative share of the 
overall docket of the Court proceeding to cases from Ontario and New Brunswick has varied 
over time. Given these problems in devising a perfect measure of legal aid fi nancing, we 
concluded that the fi gures from Ontario would provide an acceptable rough indicator. Th is 
confi dence is increased by the fi nding that there were substantially more rights cases heard by 
the Court from Ontario than from any other province (the cases from Ontario constituted 
30.3 per cent of all rights cases heard by the Court) and that the correlation in the changes in 
the number of rights cases in Ontario and the total number of rights cases heard per year by 
the Court is high and statistically signifi cant (r=0.79).
64. Th e only direct measure of the political preferences of the justices not derived from their 
voting behavior on the Court is based on an analysis of newspaper editorials and news stories 
published at the time of their appointment. It is constructed in a manner that is analogous 
to the Segal and Cover scores, which are widely used in analyses of the behaviour of justices 
on the USSC. Unfortunately, this measure is not available for justices appointed before the 
1960s because prior to that time, there was virtually a complete absence of media coverage 
that discussed judicial appointees in terms of their political preferences. However, for the 
period between 1984–2003, Ostberg and Wetstein have shown that this independent 
measure of ideology is substantially correlated with the measure of ideology used in our 
analysis. Osterberg & Wetstein, supra note 46 at 129.
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VI. TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS 
To determine the impact of the institutional interventions, we utilize the Box-
Jenkins method for Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) time-
series modeling.65 Th is technique divides the time series into two parts, which 
include the time dependent processes and the impact of the interventions. Th is 
model can generally be written as:
Yt = f(Xt) + Nt
Where Yt refl ects the dependent time series, Xt refl ects the intervention, and Nt 
refl ects the stochastic noise component.66 
More simply, we want to understand the impact that the intervention 
variables—the 1982 Charter, the 1975 docket change, and the 1997 docket 
change—had on the Court’s agenda. Because we are dealing with a time span of 
fi fty-seven years and we want to assess the impact these changes or “interventions” 
had on the courts agenda, the most appropriate way to do so is to analyze the data 
using an intervention model (with an ARIMA specifi cation). Th e intervention 
model essentially fl ags the occurrence of an event so that one can examine whether 
anything changed after the intervention occurred. Th is more sophisticated method 
of analyzing data permits us to understand more fully the nature of the infl uence 
(if any) of the four interventions we identifi ed, rather than simply analyzing the 
65. George EP Box & Gwilym M Jenkins, Time Series Analysis: Forecasting and Control, revised ed 
(San Francisco: Holden-Day Press, 1976). 
66. In order to properly analyze the impact of the intervention variables on the times series, we 
estimate our models using ARIMA Th is is done because the stochastic processes are removed 
through the estimation of ARIMA. ARIMA modeling begins on the premise that it is fi rst 
necessary to identify what kind of data-generating process is driving the data. See Richard 
McCleary & Richard A Hay Jr, Applied Time Series Analysis for the Social Sciences (Beverly 
Hills: Sage Publications, 1980). In other words, ARIMA analysis entails model identifi cation 
of the (p,d,q) parameters, then estimating, and fi nally diagnosing the residuals. Specifi cally, 
intervention analysis begins with establishing the ARIMA properties of the series (i.e., the 
Nt component). Th is means that we needed to determine the three parameters (p,d,q). Th e 
“p” parameter refers to the number autoregressive (AR) parameters necessary to fi t the time 
series. Th e “d” parameter indicates the number of times the series needs to be diff erenced (for 
stationary purposes). Finally “q” refers to the amount of moving average (MA) parameters 
required to fi t the series in order to turn it into white noise. Th is is important because a white 
noise time series means that both the mean and the variance are stationary. After performing 
the necessary diagnostics for identifying the ARIMA properties (such as examining the 
autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions, ACF and PACF, examining the 
correlograms against lag length, and applying the Dickey-Fuller test) we determined each 
model’s ARIMA specifi cation. Because each model has a diff erent ARIMA identifi cation, 
please see Tables 1-4 for the ARIMA specifi cation of each analysis.
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data through a set of graphs. Because of the additional years under review and data 
collected, we present a more accurate estimation of the impact these interventions 
may have had.67 
VII. RESULTS
A. TRENDS IN THE COURT’S AGENDA—A FIRST LOOK
Before we discuss in greater detail the results of our times series models, we fi rst 
look at the overall trends for the changing agenda of the Court. For a visual 
overview of the changing agenda of the Court, we fi rst turn to Figure 1, which 
plots the trends over time in the proportion of the Court’s agenda devoted to cases 
presenting rights claims. Th e fi gure presents data on the docket of the Court for 
each year for a fi fty-seven year period. Th e vertical lines in the graph mark three 
changes to the Court. Th e fi rst line marks the Supreme Court Act of 1975, which 
gave the Court nearly complete control of its docket; the second line marks the 
adoption of the Charter;68 and the third line represents an amendment to the 
Supreme Court Act in 1997, which eliminated most of the remaining appeals as 
of right in criminal cases.
67. After we determined each model’s ARIMA specifi cation, the next step included adding 
the intervention variables to our model. ARIMA treats these intervention variables 
much like independent variables in a regression model in that it estimates coeffi  cients 
for each intervention variable that best fi t the data. After running each model with the 
interventions, we determined that the Autocorrelation Function Areas (AFC) and the Partial 
Autocorrelation Function (PACFs) errors were within the acceptable limits. Generally 
speaking, the PACF is the amount of correlation between two variables and AFC refers to the 
amount of correlation between a variable and its lag.  If the coeffi  cient estimate is signifi cant, 
we can be statistically confi dent that the intervention had an eff ect. Finally, in order to assess 
whether each model is a reasonable fi t to the data, we examined the residuals for each model 
by analyzing the ACF and PACF and examining the Box-Ljung statistic (this indicates 
whether the autocorrelations are diff erent from zero). Th e results of these diagnostic 
checks for each model indicated the residuals estimated are random, which demonstrated 
that the ARIMA model was properly identifi ed. In addition we also examined the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) goodness of fi t measure in order to determine the “best” 
ARIMA model to use.
68. No one would expect that the Charter would have an instantaneous eff ect on the agenda of 
the Court; cases take some time to work their way up the judicial hierarchy to reach that 
level. Th us, in all of the analyses below, we mark the beginning of the Charter eff ect in 1984, 
when the fi rst cases raising a Charter claim reached the Court, rather than in 1982 when the 
Charter was adopted.
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FIGURE 1: CHANGE IN THE RIGHTS AGENDA OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 
PERCENTAGE OF RIGHTS CLAIMS CASES PER YEAR 1945–2005
1950          1955         1960          1965         1970          1975         1980          1985         1990          1995         2000         2005          2010      
       
Year
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f C
as
es
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
   
   
   
   
   
0 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 2
0 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
40
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 6
0 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 8
0
Docket Change 1975
First Charter Case 1984
Docket Change 1997
B. CHANGE IN THE RIGHTS AGENDA OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CANADA: PERCENTAGE OF RIGHTS CASES PER YEAR 1945–2005
Figure 1 demonstrates that there has been a dramatic change in the agenda of the 
Court that deserves Epp’s description of it as a “rights revolution.”69 Th ere appear 
to be two fairly sharp breaks in the data: one occurring with the increased agenda 
control gained by the Court in the Supreme Court Act of 1975 and the second 
corresponding to the adoption of the Charter. After each of these changes, there 
was a sharp upward surge in the proportion of rights cases on the agenda of the 
Court, followed by annual fl uctuations at the new higher level. For thirty years 
following the end of World War II, rights litigation made up a relatively steady but 
modest proportion of the Court’s agenda, staying below one-fi fth of the docket 
in most years.70 However, once the Court gained greater control of its docket, 
the proportion of rights cases rapidly increased to between 30 per cent and 40 
per cent of the docket. Th en, with the adoption of the Charter, a further large 
increase occurred in the rights agenda of the Court. In summary, for thirty years 
prior to 1975, rights cases made up less than 20 per cent of the Court’s docket 
in most years; then, for the next decade, they accounted for between 20 per cent 
and 40 per cent in every year. Since the adoption of the Charter, rights cases have 
constituted more than 40 per cent in every year and have surpassed 60 per cent 
69. Epp, Rights Revolution, supra note 5 at 177.
70. Additional analysis not presented indicates that almost all of these rights cases involved 
criminal appeals in the years before 1975.
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of the docket in a number of years. Th us, over time, the attention of the Court to 
rights cases has more than doubled. 
Figure 1 indicates that the eff ect of the adoption of the Charter on the rights agenda 
of the Court appears to be major. With the adoption of the Charter, the proportion 
of rights cases on the docket immediately jumped 15 per cent above the previous year 
(and 13 per cent above the average of the preceding three years), and this increased 
attention to rights has continued throughout the Charter period. Th e proportion of 
rights cases on the Court’s docket in every year after the adoption of the Charter was 
greater than the proportion of rights cases on the docket in any of the nearly forty 
years prior to the adoption of the Charter.71
Th e trends displayed in Figure 1 do not provide much support for the contention 
that it was the increasing magnitude of the support structure for rights that provided 
the major engine for the increasing attention paid to rights by the Court. For example, 
from 1960 to 1975, when the extent of the support structure was gradually increasing, 
the trend in the Court’s agenda was essentially fl at. Th en, immediately after the Court 
gained control of its agenda in 1975, the proportion of rights cases on the Court’s 
docket increased quickly, jumping from 21 per cent to 26 per cent in the fi rst year, 
and never subsequently falling below 28 per cent. 
Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that at least most of the changes in the 
elements of the support structure thesis, such as the increasing diversity of the bar and 
the increasing number of interest groups involved in litigation, continued to increase in 
the late 1990s and the early years of the twenty-fi rst century. Th us, the rights agenda on 
the Court should have continued to increase in the last decade. But, contrary to these 
expectations, the proportion of rights cases on the docket has declined fairly steeply. 
After reaching 69 per cent of the docket in 1996, the proportion of rights cases fell 
below 60 per cent for all but one of the next nine years. For the 1997–2005 period, 
rights cases made up on average only 54 per cent of the Court’s agenda.
C. CHANGE IN THE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STATUTES AGENDA OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 1945–2005
Turning to judicial review, a similar though less dramatic change in the agenda of the 
Court can be observed in Figure 2. Prior to the adoption of the Charter, there was not 
71. Running a simple OLS regression model (not displayed) provides results that are consistent 
with this visual interpretation. Using the three Court changes as the only independent 
variables, both the 1975 change in docket control and the adoption of the Charter produced 
statistically signifi cant increases in the proportion of rights cases on the docket, with the 
magnitude of the change associated with the Charter being approximately 1.7 times greater 
than those associated with the docket change.
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a single year in which as many as 3 per cent of the Court’s decisions resulted in the 
declaration that a statute was unconstitutional. During the Charter period, however, 
the Court declared a statute unconstitutional in an average of 4 per cent of its cases. 
Looked at slightly diff erently, the modal response of the Court before the Charter
was a year in which no statutes were declared unconstitutional (in twenty-six of forty 
years), though at least one statute has been declared unconstitutional in every year 
since the adoption of the Charter. And as we saw in the analysis of the rights agenda, 
there is little evidence that the increasing support structure for rights had a more than 
negligible eff ect before the agenda change that gave the Court greater control of its 
docket. In thirteen of the sixteen years from 1960 to 1975, no statutes were declared 
unconstitutional.
FIGURE 2: CHANGE IN THE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STATUTES AGENDA OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA CASES 1945–2005
D. CHANGE IN THE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LAWS AND EXECUTIVE ACTION 
STRUCK DOWN BY THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 1945–2005 
On its face, it would appear that the Charter’s protection of individual rights might 
produce a greater increase in the constraint on the abuses of executive power than 
an increase in the exercise of judicial review directed at statutes would. Th us, an 
analysis of judicial review that only examines judicial review of statutes might 
signifi cantly underestimate the overall eff ect of the Charter on constitutional policy 
making. To explore that possibility, we present in Figure 3 the annual trend in the 
percentage of all cases in which the Court exercised judicial review to strike down 
either statutes or administrative action.
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FIGURE 3: CHANGE IN JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LAWS AND EXECUTIVE ACTION 
STRUCK DOWN BY THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 1945–2005
Th e trends displayed in Figure 3 are dramatic. In the thirty years before the 
passage of the Supreme Court Act of 1975, there was almost no judicial review of any 
kind. Subsequently, in the decade before the adoption of the Charter, the average 
rate of judicial review rose to slightly above 2 per cent of the cases on the docket of 
the Court. But then, with the adoption of the Charter, the rate of judicial review 
skyrocketed, rising from a rate of 2.5 per cent per year in the four years before the 
Charter to almost 10 per cent in the fi rst two years of Charter litigation. While the 
rate of judicial review subsequently fl uctuated from year to year, the average rate for 
the entire Charter period has hovered just under 10 per cent. Prior to the adoption of 
the Charter, there was only a single year in which the rate of judicial review reached 
5 per cent; after the adoption of the Charter, there has been only a single year in 
which the Court failed to exercise judicial review in at least 5 per cent of its cases. In 
a pattern that is very similar to other trends examined to date, there is little evidence 
that the support structure that was growing in the 1960s and 1970s had any eff ect 
on judicial review before the adoption of the Supreme Court Act. In fact, from 1960 
to 1975, there was not a single year in which judicial review was exercised in even 
2 per cent of the cases on the agenda of the Court.
E. AGENDA CHANGE IN CONSTITUTIONAL CASES IN THE SUPREME 
COURT OF CANADA 1945–2005
Our fi nal examination of the trends in involvement of the Court in constitutional 
politics comprises an examination of all cases in which the Court was asked by litigants 
to resolve a constitutional question. Th e trends in Figure 4 suggest that the dramatic 
increase in constitutional litigation may have been the result of the combined eff ects of 
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increases in the support structure, increasing docket control, and the adoption of the 
Charter. After two decades of fl uctuation without any clear linear trend, it appears that 
the proportion of cases raising one or more constitutional questions began to slowly 
rise in the late 1960s, and that this trend then accelerated after the enactment of the 
Supreme Court Act in 1975. Th is trend appeared to increase sharply immediately after 
the adoption of the Charter. Th us, starting from a low of no cases raising constitutional 
challenges in 1967, the proportion of constitutional cases on the docket rose to above 
3 per cent in most of the next eight years and then averaged over 7 per cent in the 
decade following the arrival of the Supreme Court Act. But then, as soon as the period of 
Charter litigation began, the proportion of cases raising constitutional issues immediately 
rose to 17 per cent and never fell below that point again, averaging over 30 per cent 
for the Charter period. Th at is, the average proportion of cases raising constitutional 
claims after the adoption of the Charter was nearly double the highest level in any of 
the nearly forty years preceding the adoption of the Charter.
FIGURE 3: AGENDA CHANGE IN CONSTITUTIONAL CASES IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF CANADA 1945–2005
In summary, for both the rights agenda and for each of our three measures of the 
involvement of the Court in constitutional politics, a visual examination of the trends 
suggests a major impact of the adoption of the Charter on the agenda of the Court. In 
all four graphs, there was an immediate and sharp increase following the adoption of 
the Charter. In each fi gure, it appears that the 1975 change in docket control also was 
associated with increases in a rights and constitutional agenda, but the magnitude of 
these changes was substantially smaller than those associated with the adoption of the 
Charter. In contrast, there is minimal evidence to suggest that an increasing support 
structure had an eff ect on the Court’s agenda that was independent of docket control 
and the adoption of the Charter.
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F. A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF AGENDA CHANGE
Th e support structure thesis essentially makes two analytically distinct claims. Th e 
fi rst claim is that there has been a dramatic change over time in the agenda of the 
Court, a “rights revolution” in which the agenda of the Court has come to contain 
an increasing proportion of cases raising rights claims and increasing demands for 
the Court to become involved in constitutional policy making. Additionally, it is 
asserted that the main causes for these agenda changes are increases in the support 
structure for rights. We fi nd that the agenda change on the Court has been so great 
that one is justifi ed in labeling it a “rights revolution” (see Figures 1–4). Th ere is 
little doubt that the agenda of the Court in the post-Charter period is dramatically 
diff erent from its agenda during the 1950s. In essence, Figures 1–4, which cover a 
much longer period than Epp’s data, support his basic conclusions about changes 
in the agenda.72
 According to the support structure thesis, the role of constitutional change is 
quite modest. To evaluate more systematically whether the Charter played a role in 
this change, we proceed to statistically test the relative impact of the Charter, elements 
of the support structure, judicial ideology, and changes to the Court’s docket.
TABLE 1: ARIMA (1,1,1) TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS OF TRENDS IN COMBINED RIGHTS 
AGENDA 1949–2005
Variables Coeffi  cient Estimate Robust Standard Error
Lagged Combined Rights Agenda 0.237 0.145
Lagged Ideology -0.085 0.081
Lagged Ideology*
Docket Change 1975
0.240* 0.122
Docket Change 1975 0.084* 0.035
Docket Change 1997 -0.026 0.076
Charter Rights 0.118*** 0.033
Lawyers (1000s) 0.002 0.004
Ontario Legal Aid ($ Million) 0.00057** 0.00021
Constant -0.0062 0.00196
∑ 0.051*** 0.005
Wald Chi2 664.68***
Log Likelihood 83.22
NOTES: N=55, *p<.05, **p<.01 ***p<.001 (one tailed)
72. Epp, Rights Revolution, supra note 5 at 194-96; Epp, “Do Bills of Rights Matter,” supra note 3 
at 777.
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We test these claims with an ARIMA (1,1,1)73 time-series analysis, with 
interventions for the three major changes occurring during the time series—the 
Supreme Court Act of 1975, which granted greater agenda control to the court; 
the amendment to that act in 1997, which further increased the Court’s docket 
control by eliminating many criminal appeals as of right; and the adoption of the 
Charter. We also model the eff ects of elements of the support structure and the 
conditional eff ect of changing judicial ideology.
Th e model indicates that after one accounts for the basic trend in the data, the 
eff ects of changes in the support structure, judicial ideology, and statutory increases 
in the ability of the Court to control its docket, the adoption of the Charter had 
a major impact on the trend. On average, the adoption of the Charter increased 
the proportion of rights cases on the Court’s docket by 12 per cent, a change 
that is signifi cant at the .001 level.74 Th at is, once the data have been diff erenced 
(detrended),75 the evidence suggests that the proximate cause of a signifi cant 
increase in the rights agenda of the court is the Charter.
Consistent with the data in Figure 1, the Supreme Court Act of 1975 also had 
a statistically signifi cant impact on the docket, though one that was substantially 
smaller than the impact of the Charter. In contrast, the 1997 amendments did 
not have a signifi cant eff ect on the rights agenda.76 Docket control, however, 
remains an important part of the overall explanation of increases in the rights 
agenda because of the strong conditional eff ect of ideology on the size of the rights 
agenda. Increasing liberal preferences among the justices became an important 
predictor of increasing attention to rights cases only after the Court achieved 
discretionary control over most of its docket. As Table 1 indicates, there is a strong 
and statistically signifi cant relationship between increasing liberalism on the Court 
and an increase in the proportion of rights cases on the Court’s docket only after 
the adoption of the 1975 Supreme Court Act, which increased the justices’ control 
73. See supra note 66.
74. Th at is, there is only one chance in one thousand that the observed change in the proportion 
of rights cases occurred by chance or that it is due to random variation naturally occurring in 
the agenda of the Court.
75. “Diff erencing” or “de-trending” is a process to control for autocorrelation. We want to 
control for the dependency the value at time “t” has on time “t-1” so that we may observe the 
actual values.
76. Epp, “Do Bills of Rights Matter?,” supra note 3. Epp does not discuss the eff ects of these 
amendments since they occurred after the period he studied, but it would be reasonable 
to expect them to have a negative eff ect since they removed from the docket a number of 
criminal cases which Epp counts as part of the “rights agenda.”
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over their docket. Before 1975, changes in the ideology of the justices appear to 
have had a negligible impact on the rights agenda of the Court. 
Th e time-series analysis provides mixed support in regard to the eff ect of 
changes in the support structure. Increases in the amount of legal aid for indigent 
criminal defendants are associated with statistically signifi cant increases in the 
number of rights cases on the docket. Th e magnitude of the eff ect of an increase 
of one standard deviation in the amount of legal aid funding, however, is less than 
half of the eff ect of the adoption of the Charter. In contrast to the support structure 
theory, though, increases in the number of lawyers do not appear to increase the 
proportion of rights cases heard by the Court. 
TABLE 2: ARIMA (2,1,1) TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS OF TRENDS IN JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 
STATUTES 1949–2005
Variables Coeffi  cient Estimate Robust Standard Error
Lagged Judicial Review Agenda -0.250 0.209
Lagged Ideology -0.022 0.017
Lagged Ideology*
Docket Change 1975
0.093* 0.030
Docket Change 1975 0.017* 0.008
Docket Change 1997 0.052** 0.019
Charter Rights 0.018** 0.007
Lawyers (1000s) -0.002 0.001
Ontario Legal Aid ($ Million) 0.00019*** 0.00005
Constant 0.00083 0.00045
∑ 0.011*** 0.001
Wald Chi2 474.85***
Log Likelihood 167.61
NOTES: N=55, *p<.05, **p<.01 ***p<.001 (one tailed)
We next examine changes in the Court’s use of judicial review. Table 2 presents 
the ARIMA (2,1,1)77 time-series analysis of the limited conception of judicial 
review (only counting cases in which statutes were struck down) examined by 
Epp. Th e results are quite similar to those for our analysis of changes in the rights 
agenda. Both the adoption of the Charter and the adoption of the Supreme Court 
Act in 1975, which increased the Court’s discretionary control of its docket, are 
related to a statistically signifi cant degree to increases in the use of judicial review 
77. See supra note 66.
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by the Court. Th e magnitude of the impact of these two changes appears to be 
quite similar. Th e adoption of the Charter results in an increase in the proportion 
of the Court’s docket devoted to judicial review that is statistically signifi cant (p < 
.05),78 even after one controls for the underlying trend in the data and the eff ects 
of the two statutory changes in the Court’s power to control its agenda. Similarly, 
the 1997 amendments to the Supreme Court Act, which further increased the 
Court’s discretion over its docket, also produced a statistically signifi cant increase 
in the number of cases involving judicial review. As noted in Table 1, the impact 
of the increasing liberalism of the justices is conditioned upon the Court’s control 
of its docket. Once again, the evidence for the eff ect of increases in the support 
structure is mixed. Increases in legal aid are strongly related to increases in the 
use of judicial review (p < .001),79 but increases in the number of lawyers do not 
lead to similar increases.
TABLE 3: ARIMA (2,1,0) TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS OF TRENDS IN JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 
STATUTES & ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 1949–2005
Variables Coeffi  cient Estimate Robust Standard Error
Lagged Expanded Judicial Review Agenda -0.175 0.157
Lagged Ideology -0.011 0.032
Lagged Ideology*
Docket Change 1975
0.034 0.063
Docket Change 1975 0.028 0.023
Docket Change 1997 0.134** 0.048
Charter Rights 0.069** 0.025
Lawyers (1000s) -0.009 0.0026
Ontario Legal Aid ($ Million) 0.00026# 0.00015
Constant 0.006 0.003
∑ 0.024*** 0.002
Wald Chi2 35.75***
Log Likelihood 125.07
NOTES: N=55, *p<.05, **p<.01 ***p<.001, #p=.08 (one tailed)
78. Th at is, there is only one chance in twenty that the observed change in the proportion of 
rights cases occurred by chance or that it was due to random variation naturally occurring in 
the agenda of the Court.
79. See supra note 74.
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When one examines the more inclusive conception of judicial review, the eff ects 
of the Charter appear to be even stronger. Th e ARIMA (2,1,0)80 time-series analysis 
reported in Table 3 reveals that on average, adoption of the Charter increased the 
proportion of cases per year in which the Court exercised judicial review by close 
to 7 per cent, after one controls for the underlying trend in the data and the eff ects 
of the changes in the support structure, the ideology of the justices, and docket 
control. Th is eff ect of the Charter is signifi cant at the .01 level.81 In this model, 
the statutory changes in agenda control adopted in 1997 had even larger and 
statistically signifi cant eff ects on the frequency of the exercise of judicial review by 
the Court, but the eff ects of the 1975 changes were not signifi cant.82 Th e principal 
eff ect of the 1997 changes was to eliminate appeals as of right brought in a number 
of criminal cases. Many of these cases do not raise any signifi cant constitutional 
challenges to police or prosecutorial conduct. Moreover, the elimination of these 
appeals as of right freed up additional docket space for the Court, and it appears 
that the increased space was often fi lled with challenges to police conduct that were 
based on alleged Charter violations. So, the elimination from the Court’s docket of 
a number of cases raising no Charter claims and their replacement with cases that 
often did raise such claims had the practical eff ect of increasing the proportion of 
cases raising signifi cant constitutional issues.83 
Changes in the ideology of the justices on the Court appear to have little 
impact on the likelihood of exercising judicial review. Neither the direct nor 
80. See supra note 66.
81. Th at is, there is only one chance in one hundred that the observed change in the proportion 
of judicial review cases occurred by chance or that it is due to random variation naturally 
occurring in the agenda of the Court.
82. Both the direct eff ects of the changes in docket control in 1975 and the multiplicative eff ect 
of docket control and judicial ideology failed to reach statistically signifi cant levels.
83. Th e dependent variable in Table 3 is a combination of cases in which the Court declared 
a statute unconstitutional and those in which it struck down an administrative action. 
In practice, the latter occurred more frequently. Th us, the majority of cases in which 
the dependent variable equals “one” are those in which the Court struck down an 
administrative action. Virtually all of these instances of judicial review are taken because of 
the incompatibility of the administrative action with the Charter. After the Court gained 
greater control of its docket in 1975, Figure 2 indicates that the proportion of cases involving 
judicial review of a statute increased. In 1975, though, there was no Charter and therefore 
little or no chance for the Court to strike down administrative actions. Th us, the increase 
after 1975 in the proportion of its docket involving the expanded conception of judicial 
review refl ected in Table 3 (i.e., striking statutes and administrative actions) did not increase 
nearly as much as it did after the 1997 changes in docket control allowed the Court to 
increase both forms of judicial review.
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the conditional impact of changing ideology reaches conventional standards for 
statistical signifi cance. As in both of the previous models, evidence of the impact 
of increases in the support structure are mixed. Increases in the number of lawyers 
in the country did not produce any increase in the exercise of judicial review and 
increases in the amount of legal aid produced changes that were only marginally 
signifi cant. 
To better appreciate the magnitude of the changes to judicial review modeled 
in Table 3, one should note (see Figure 3) that prior to the adoption of the Charter, 
the Court exercised judicial review in only 1 per cent of its cases—there was not 
a single pre-Charter year in which the Court exercised judicial review in as many 
as 6 per cent of its cases. Th us, the eff ect of the Charter on average was to more 
than triple the exercise of judicial review by the Court. 
TABLE 4: ARIMA (1,1,0) TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS OF TRENDS IN PROPORTION OF CASES 
RAISING CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS ON THE AGENDA OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CANADA 1949–2005
Variables Coeffi  cient Estimate Robust Standard Error
Lagged Expanded Judicial Review Agenda -0.312 0.204
Lagged Ideology -0.011 0.072
Lagged Ideology*
Docket Change 1975
0.049 0.159
Docket Change 1975 0.012 0.062
Docket Change 1997 0.037 0.099
Charter Rights 0.112* 0.061
Lawyers (1000s) -0.003 0.0057
Ontario Legal Aid ($ Million) 0.00010 0.00048
Constant 0.001 0.009
∑ 0.059*** 0.005
Wald Chi2 17.33*
Log Likelihood 76.94
NOTES: N=55, *p<.05, **p<.01 ***p<.001 (one tailed)
Our fi nal analysis involves an ARIMA (1,1,0)84 model of the factors that 
impacted change over time in the proportion of cases on the Court’s docket that 
raise constitutional questions. Th e results are presented in Table 4. Th e dramatic 
fi nding of the analysis in Table 4 is that of all of the potential infl uences on 
84. See supra note 66.
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agenda change on the Court, only the adoption of the Charter is associated with 
a statistically signifi cant increase in the proportion of cases raising constitutional 
questions. On average, the adoption of the Charter increased the proportion of 
cases raising constitutional questions on the Court’s docket by 12 per cent, a 
change that is signifi cant at the .05 level.85 Neither the direct nor the conditional 
eff ects of changing judicial ideology were signifi cant and neither of the changes 
in docket control produced signifi cantly more constitutional questions. Similarly, 
changes in the measures of the support structure for rights are associated with 
agenda changes that are small and not signifi cant. 
In summary, the results of all four time-series models provide statistical 
confi rmation of the impressions gleaned from the earlier examination of the trends 
in agenda change derived from an inspection of the results presented graphically. Th e 
adoption of the Charter had eff ects on both the rights agenda and the constitutional 
issues agenda of the Court, which were both large and statistically signifi cant. 
Support for Epp’s theory, which stated that the most important infl uences on these 
aspects of the “rights revolution” were the changes in agenda control legislated 
in 1975 and increases in the support structure for rights, was ambiguous at best. 
Th ere was substantial indication that changes in agenda control mattered, but the 
eff ects were not consistent across the four models. Specifi cally, the Supreme Court 
Act of 1975 was associated with increases in rights cases on the agenda and with 
increases in our fi rst measure of judicial review. Moreover, in all four of our models, 
the impact of the ideology of the justices on agenda change was conditional on 
the Court gaining control of its docket. However, increased agenda control did 
not appear to contribute to an increase in the most comprehensive measure of the 
Court’s involvement in constitutional politics. Moreover, the magnitude of the 
direct eff ect of gaining docket control in 1975 appeared to be roughly only half as 
large as the contribution of the adoption of the Charter. Support for the asserted 
importance of changes in the support structure was mixed. Two measures of the 
support structure were included in the models. Th e fi rst (increases in the number of 
lawyers) was not associated with agenda change to a statistically signifi cant degree 
in any of the four models. Th e second measure (increasing government funding) 
was strongly related to agenda change in two models, only marginally related in 
one model, and had no statistically signifi cant relationship in the fi nal model. 
85. See supra note 78.
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VIII. DISCUSSION
We are reminded of an important truism that neither constitutions nor any 
other institutional features can bring about substantial change all by themselves. 
In modern, complex, and pluralistic democracies, almost no major long-lasting 
change can be brought about solely through the eff orts of a single political actor 
or institution. Almost all signifi cant change is the result of interactions among 
multiple players and institutions. When multiple actors and institutions contribute 
to change, there are frequently patterns of reciprocal infl uence. Th us, Epp’s 
argument—the availability of adequate funding for indigents seeking to raise 
rights challenges and rights-oriented lawyers played a role in increasing the rights 
agenda pursued by the Court—is almost certainly correct. 
Th e interactions among rights-oriented lawyers and groups, changes to the 
Court’s agenda and judicial review, policy agendas of prime ministers, and the 
preferences of the justices themselves appear to be complex and multifaceted. For 
instance, both Brodie86 and Manfredi87 note the important role played by informal 
associations of feminist lawyers and the more formal organizational participation of 
the CCLA in debates over the drafting of the Charter. Th e existence of the Charter, 
in turn, provided an incentive for prime ministers interested in rights policy to 
consider more carefully the preferences of their judicial appointees. Additionally, once 
the Charter was adopted, the incentives were in place for the creation of additional 
groups to take advantage of its provisions. Th e most successful group litigator in 
the Charter period has been LEAF. Yet, LEAF was founded after the adoption of 
the Charter and the primary reason for its creation was to take advantage of the 
possibilities created by the adoption of this constitutional enactment.88 Similarly, 
while the CCLA pushed for the adoption of the Charter, prior to the Charter it had 
largely attempted to infl uence policy through legislative lobbying. Following the 
adoption of the Charter it changed its tactics and focused its strategy on litigation 
for rights. Moreover, as the analysis above demonstrates, the preferences of the 
justices who were interested in pursuing a rights agenda had little impact until the 
Supreme Court Act of 1975 gave them greater control over their agenda. Th us, the 
relationship between the infl uence of groups, judicial preferences, changing rules 
on docket control, and the infl uence of the Charter on the increasing rights agenda 
of the Court appears to be interactive and mutually reinforcing. 
86. Brodie, supra note 52.
87. Christopher P Manfredi, Feminist Activism in the Supreme Court (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 2004).
88. Brodie, supra, note 52 at 30-31.
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Th e current analysis demonstrates that an increasing support structure had 
some eff ect on the increasing rights agenda of the Court. Th e more important point 
of the analysis above, though, is that even after one takes into account the eff ects 
on the overall trend produced by changes in the support structure, changes in the 
degree of docket control possessed by the Court, and the ideology of its justices, 
the adoption of the Charter still had an independent eff ect that was substantively 
important and statistically signifi cant. Once the data were appropriately diff erenced 
in an ARIMA time-series model, the robust and signifi cant relationship between 
the adoption of the Charter and the agenda increases in rights litigation and 
constitutional litigation provide strong evidence that the adoption of the Charter 
was an important proximate cause of those agenda changes. In conclusion, the 
answer to the question, “Do bills of rights matter?” is “Yes.”
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APPENDIX
Summary Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables for Models 1–4
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Depeendent Variables
Percentage of Combined Rights 
Agenda
0.355 0.192 0.094 0.765
Percentage of Judicial Review 
Agenda
0.018 0.020 0 0.079
Percentage of Expanded Judicial 
Review Agenda
0.041 0.048 0 0.145
Percentage of Constitutional Cases 
Agenda
0.140 0.137 0 0.460
Independent Variables
Lagged Combined Rights Agenda 0.349 0.192 0.094 0.765
Lagged Judicial Review Agenda 0.019 0.020 0 0.079
Lagged Expanded Judicial Review 
Agenda
0.041 0.048 0 0.145
Lagged Constitutional Cases 
Agenda
0.140 0.137 0 0.460
Lagged Ideology 0.347 0.119 0.048 0.600
Lagged Ideology*
Docket Change 1975
0.193 0.195 0 0.552
Docket Change 1975 0.544 0.503 0 1
Docket Change 1997 0.140 0.350 0 1
Charter Rights 1984 0.386 0.491 0 1
Lawyers (1000s) 31.840 21.534 8.800 77.200
Ontario Legal Aid ($ Millions) 108.674 130.059 0 362.600
